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INTRODUCTION
Under the plain language of the parties' Agreement, their agreement to arbitrate is
limited in scope. Specifically, the only reasonable and harmonious interpretation of the
Agreement's arbitration provision is that a forensic accountant is required to resolve any
disputes regarding the amounts contained in Appellee's (the "USS Parties") CAMS Data
- i.e the total amount of outstanding invoices in USS's electronic records system. The
Agreement lacks any express provision requiring that the parties' arbitrate other disputes.
However, Appellants' (the "Mariposa Franchisees") Complaint does not request that the
Court resolve any dispute regarding CAMS Data. Instead, the Complaint requests that
the Court interpret the scope of the Agreement's indemnification provision and the
Mariposa's liability under that provision. As a result, the district court erred in broadly
construing the arbitration provision and compelling the Mariposa Franchisees into
arbitration. In addition, because the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act required the district
court to stay the action pending arbitration, the district court erred in dismissing the
Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint.
ARGUMENT
I.

W H I L E THE USS PARTIES HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE MARIPOSA
FRANCHISEES HAVE RAISED CAUSES OF ACTION IN THEIR COMPLAINT
CONCERNING LIABILITY AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES'
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, THE ARBITRATION PROVISION IN THAT
AGREEMENT DOES N O T REQUIRE ARBITRATION OF THOSE ISSUES.

Arbitration is "a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to
arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."

Central Florida

Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^10* 40 P.3d 599. In this case, the
USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees entered into a settlement agreement that
addressed several issues, including (i) Mariposa Franchisees' indemnification of the USS
Parties, (ii) the parties' proprietary materials and information, (iii) future shipments and
billings between the parties, (iv) representations and warranties by the parties, and (v) a

1

covenant that Mariposa Franchisees would "not to disparage" or defame the USS Parties,
among other things. See Agreement (R. 21-54). In addition, the settlement agreement
required the Mariposa Franchisees to pay certain amounts to the USS Parties. Id The
payment provisions included a section on "Settlement Payment" where the Mariposa
Franchisees agreed to pay a lump sum to the USS Parties, which they did. (Agreement at
Tf4; R.26).

The agreement contained a "Payment for Freight Services" where the

Mariposa Franchisees agreed to reimburse USS for freight shipments, which they did.
(Agreement at ^jl; R. 22). And it contained an "Indemnification" provision where the
Mariposa Franchisees agreed to indemnify the USS Parties for any amounts paid to DHL
Express (USA), Inc. for services provided to the franchisees and their customers.
(Agreement at ^[3; R. 25).
The agreement also required the parties to arbitrate disputes concerning certain
"payments" and "amounts" and it specified that the arbitrator must be "one forensic
accountant," who will review documentation and calculate invoices.
1Jl(c); R. 24).

(Agreement at

The agreement is silent regarding the forum for resolving all other

disputes. However, the parties' intent that all other disputes be resolved through a court
action, rather than arbitration, is evidenced in the provision of the Agreement dealing
with defaults.

(Agreement at 1fl[5-6; R- 28). Under that provision, if the Mariposa

Franchisees defaulted under the Agreement, the USS Parties were required to file
Confessions of Judgment and a Stipulated Judgment in the district court.

Id

The

Mariposa Franchisees were entitled to "oppose entry of the judgment on the grounds that
no Default occurred." IdL As a result, given that the Agreement expressly requires that
the district court determine whether a default occurred and the conspicuous absence of
any provision requiring that other disputes be subject to arbitration, the Agreement must
be interpreted as not requiring every dispute to be resolved through arbitration.
In their brief, the USS Parties have acknowledged that "[t]he heart of the dispute
between the parties is whether the Mariposa [Franchisees are] obligated to indemnify the
2

USS Parties for the amounts the USS Parties had to pay to DHL for unpaid DHL
shipments and, if so, what amount they owe." (Brief of Appellees at 21) (emphasis
added). And, indeed, the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint involved the scope and
application of the indemnification provision in the settlement agreement, and the liability,
if any, of the franchisees under that provision. (R. 1-130). Specifically, the Mariposa
Franchisees maintain that they are not obligated to indemnify the USS Parties under the
circumstances, and they have requested relief in the form of declaratory judgment and an
injunction. Id. A s a result, the Complaint does not raise claims that may be reconciled
by a forensic accountant.
Notwithstanding, the USS Parties first purport to rely on the plain language of the
Agreement to claim that the scope and liability issues raised by the Complaint are subject
to arbitration. And second, they claim that the issues in the Complaint concerning scope
and liability actually qualify as disputes concerning amounts owing under the
indemnification provision.

Both of the USS Parties' claims are wrong under the plain

language of the Agreement and the Complaint.

A.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT
SUPPORT ARBITRATION.

The USS Parties' interpretation of the scope of the Agreement's arbitration
provision is overly broad and ignores the basic cannons of contract interpretation. In
advancing their interpretation, USS Parties rely heavily on Utah's presumption in favor
of arbitration. However, this presumption does not apply to interpreting the existence or
scope of the agreement to arbitrate itself. See McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Utah, 980 P.2d 694, 697, f l l (Utah App. 1999) ("Parties are required to arbitrate only
those disputes they have agreed to submit to arbitration ... [t]hus, a court deciding a
motion to compel arbitration must first determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate,
and if so, whether the agreement encompasses the claims asserted"). In this case, the

3

USS Parties have not claimed there is any ambiguity or any other circumstances under
which the presumption would be invoked. As a result, the Court must interpret the
contract "by examining the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other,
giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." G.G.A., Inc.
v. Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah App. 1989). The contract should be interpreted so
as to "harmonize all of its terms and provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect
if possible." Id. Each contract provision must be considered "in relation to all of the
others, with a view toward giving effect to all and ignoring none." McEwan v. Mountain
Land Support Corp., 2005 UT App 240,1f 16, 116 P. 3d 955 (Utah App. 2005).
With respect to their first argument, the USS Parties begin with the provision
addressing "Payment for Freight Services," which states that "any dispute regarding the
Freight Payments" will be "resolved exclusively by binding arbitration." (Agreement at
1f 1(c); R. 24; Brief of Appellees at 23 n.14). A liberal interpretation of that provision may
support the position that any dispute regarding payments for freight services under
Section 1 of the Agreement must be submitted to a forensic accountant for arbitration,
whether the dispute involves liability for freight services or the amount due for freight
services. However, an interpretation of the arbitration provision with respect to freight
services under Section 1 of the Agreement does not end the analysis in this dispute
because the Mariposa Franchisees' claims for relief relate to liability under the
indemnification provision of Section 3 of the Agreement. The question in this case is
whether the parties bargained for arbitration as a method of resolving disagreements
concerning interpretation of and liability under the separate indemnification provision of
Paragraph 3, as opposed to a dispute under the freight services provision of Paragraph 1.
As a result, USS has acknowledged that an interpretation of the indemnification
and arbitration provision contained in Paragraph 3 of the Agreement is determinative of
the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. (Appellee Brief at 23). Under the
indemnification provision of the Agreement, the Mariposa Franchisees were to indemnify
4

the USS Parties for any amounts they were required to pay to DHL on behalf of the
Mariposa Franchisees in connection with a separate lawsuit between the USS Parties and
DHL (the "DHL lawsuit"). Because the Mariposa Franchisees were not involved in the
DHL lawsuit, the USS Parties were required to keep the Mariposa Franchisees apprised
of developments in the matter and to provide information to the franchisees before
reaching any resolution with DHL that may directly affect the franchisees. Specifically,
the settlement agreement between the Mariposa Franchisees and the USS Parties stated
that if the USS Parties "desire[d] to resolve" the separate DHL lawsuit through
settlement, the USS Parties were required to give the Mariposa Franchisees access to
CAMS Data, information and invoices relevant to franchisees' financial obligations
under the indemnification provision.

(R. 25; Agreement at IP-a).1

The Mariposa

Franchisees then would have the opportunity to disagree with the purported amounts in
the CAMS Data, but they would not be allowed to interfere in the DHL lawsuit. Id. The
settlement agreement also stated that "any dispute" between the Mariposa Franchisees
and the USS Parties concerning the "amounts" set forth in the CAMS Data and invoices
shall be resolved using the procedures set forth in the "Payment for Freight Services"
provision. Id

1

The relevant portion of this provision states that:
The parties agree that, if DHL and the USS parties desire to resolve the DHL
Lawsuit through a settlement, the USS Parties shall provide the Mariposa
Franchisees with access to the CAMS Data (of the same type and nature set
forth in Paragraph 1 above) necessary to show the DHL Services provided to
the Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers. If the Mariposa Franchisees
do not agree with the amount identified by the USS Parties, the USS Parties
shall nevertheless have the right to proceed with settlement and any dispute
between the USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these
amounts shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure
set forth in Paragraph l.c above.

(R. 25; Agreement at |3.a) (emphasis added).

5

In their brief, the USS Parties repeatedly emphasize the phrase "any dispute", as
though that phrase requires the parties to resolve "all disputes" in arbitration. See e.g.
Brief of Appellees at 23, 24, 26, 31 (emphasis in original). However, the plain language
of the agreement does not support that interpretation. Central Florida Investments, Inc. v.
Parkwest Assocs., 2002 UT 3, ^[12, 40 P.3d 599. The arbitration provision in the
"Payment for Freight Services" section, read together with the indemnification provision,
is limited in scope. It unambiguously supports the interpretation that if the Mariposa
Franchisees raise a dispute concerning the amounts in the CAMS Data, those disputes
must be submitted to a forensic accountant in arbitration. It does not require the parties
to arbitrate to any dispute involving issues of liability under the indemnification provision
or interpretation of that provision.
Specifically, USS's interpretation ignores the first sentence of Paragraph 3(a),
which states that USS must provide the Mariposa Franchisees with access to "the CAMS
Data (of the same type and nature set forth in Paragraph 1 above)." (Agreement at p . a ;
R. 25). Paragraph 1(a) of the Agreement defines CAMS Data as "copies of the corporate
payment screen and open franchise invoices for their respective franchises, showing the'
amounts USS believes each Mariposa Franchisee owes."

(Agreement at fl.a; R.

22)(emphasis added). Indeed, in its brief, USS has acknowledged that the CAMS Data
refers to an amount, stating that "[ajfter disclosure of the CAMS Data, the Mariposa
Franchisees were given time to review that data and indicate whether they disputed the
amounts shown in the CAMS Data."

(Appellee Brief at 9). Given the immediate

proximity of the sentence requiring that the Mariposa Franchisees be provided with the
CAMS Data amount to the sentence referring to the Mariposa Franchisees disagreeing
with the "amount identified by the USS Parties" and requiring arbitration of any disputes
"concerning these amounts," the only harmonious and reasonable interpretation of the
Agreement is that the parties only agreed to submit any dispute regarding the CAMS
Data amount to arbitration.
6

In addition, USS's interpretation renders Paragraph 3.a. redundant and/or
meaningless. Paragraph 3.a contains two separate and distinct invocations of arbitration.
First, "[i]f the Mariposa Franchisees do not agree with the amount identified by the USS
Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right to proceed with settlement and
any dispute between the USS Parties and the Mariposa Franchisees concerning these
amounts shall be resolved in accordance with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in
Paragraph l.c above." (Agreement at |3.a; R. 25). Second, "if the USS Parties are
determined to owe DHL, through a judgment, any amount for services provided to the
Mariposa Franchisees and/or their customers, any dispute between the USS Parties and
the Mariposa Franchisees concerning such amounts shall be resolve [sic] in accordance
with the dispute resolution procedure set forth in Paragraph l.c above." Id. Under USS's
interpretation, which requires that all disputes be arbitrated, this repeated reference to the
arbitration procedure would redundant and meaningless. Indeed, the Paragraph 3.a would
be rendered meaningless in almost its entirety. Under USS's interpretation, Paragraph
3.a. would stand for the simple proposition that all disputes regarding the indemnification
amounts would be subject to arbitration. All of the verbiage defining the circumstances
under which the parties would follow the arbitration procedures would be meaningless.
As a result, the only reasonable and harmonious interpretation of Paragraph 3.a., which
gives meaning to all of its terms, is that the parties' intended that the arbitration
procedures only apply to specific well-defined disputes involving the CAMS Data
amounts.
Furthermore, USS's interpretation renders part of Paragraph l(c)(i), which defines
the role of arbitrator, meaningless. Under Paragraph l(c)(i), "the parties shall submit the
matter to binding arbitration before one forensic accountant, who shall review the parties'
documentation and establish the amount owed to USS, if any, on any disputed invoices."
(Agreement at fl.c; R. 24) (emphasis added). If the parties intended that the arbitrator
decide legal issues, such as whether the indemnification provision had been triggered and
7

the proportionate amount of each Mariposa Franchisees' liability, the more limited
definition of the arbitrator's role contained in Paragraph l.c.i would be meaningless.
Instead, the harmonious and reasonable interpretation of Paragraphs 3(a) and 1(c) is that
the forensic accountant would review the CAMS Data, which included all "open
franchise invoices," and determine the amount due "on any disputed invoices."
(Agreement at ffljl.a, l.c; R. 22, 24) (emphasis added).2 Such an interpretation also
makes more sense from a practical standpoint - a forensic accountant is more qualified
and would be more efficient at resolving disputed invoices than a judge or jury. On the
other hand, a judge would be more qualified to make legal determinations regarding
whether the indemnification provision had been triggered or the pro rata amount of each
Mariposa franchisees' indemnification obligation.
In this case, as admitted by both the parties, the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint
does not request that the district court resolve a dispute over the CAMS Data amounts.
Rather it seeks declaratory judgment as to whether the Mariposa Franchisees are
obligated under the circumstances to indemnify the USS Parties at all. The Complaint
states that the Mariposa Franchisees made efforts to obtain information relating to the

2

Furthermore, USS's interpretation creates a contradictory timeline within the Settlement
Agreement. Pursuant to Paragraph 3.a, if Mariposa Franchisees disagreed with the
amounts "identified by the USS Parties, the USS Parties shall nevertheless have the right
to proceed with settlement and any dispute ... concerning these amounts shall be
resolved" through arbitration. (Paragraph Tf3.a). Therefore, according to this provision,
the disputed amount is identified by USS prior to entering into a settlement with DHL.
However, the indemnification amount in Paragraph 3 is the amount that "USS [is]
determined to owe DHL through judgment or settlement for DHL services." (Paragraph
TJ3). In other words, the indemnification amount is not determined until after the
settlement with DHL is finalized. As a result, USS's interpretation is inherently
contradictory because USS would be required to provide the Mariposa Franchisees with
the amount they were determined to owe DHL through settlement before such a
settlement had even taken place. Instead, the harmonious reading is that the amount
referred to is the CAMS Data, which already existed prior to any settlement between USS
and DHL.

8

resolution of the DHL lawsuit and the USS Parties' liability to DHL upon resolution of
that lawsuit. (Complaint at 1H62-63, 71, 79-80; R. 1-130). The Mariposa Franchisees
therefore filed the lawsuit to resolve those liability issues and they have asserted causes
of action for interpretation and proper enforcement of the Agreement. (Complaint at
H76-122; R. 1-130).
The Mariposa Franchisees' course of action was proper.

The settlement

agreement contemplates arbitration with a forensic accountant only when invoices and
CAM Data are in dispute; it is otherwise silent as to any challenge concerning liability or
interpretation of the indemnification provision. An accountant may be uniquely situated
to resolve disputes concerning amounts and invoices quickly and efficiently, but lacks the
training and qualification to resolve questions of liability and interpretation.

In that

instance, the district court should resolve the liability issues and then, once they are
resolved, order the parties to arbitrate any dispute concerning amounts.3
While the USS Parties claim that such a procedure "is unreasonable and would
result in nonsensical outcomes" (Brief of Appellees at 28), the procedure is supported by
the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. The Act allows a district court to sever claims in a
civil action and to retain and resolve those claims that are not covered by an enforceable
arbitration agreement. The court is required to refer the remaining claims to arbitration.
See Utah Code § 78B-11-108(7).

Indeed, by only having the arbitration procedure

applicable to the specific circumstances when a judgment had been entered against USS
or prior to USS entering into a settlement with DHL, the parties were limiting the
arbitration to circumstances where legal proceedings were unnecessary. Specifically, if a
judgment had been entered against USS, liability under the indemnification provision
would not be an issue - only the amount of each Mariposa Franchisees' liability.
Similarly, if the USS Parties kept the Mariposa Franchisees informed of settlement
3

The Complaint in this case did not ask the district court to decide amounts. Moreover,
it is not unusual for issues of liability and damages to be bifurcated.
Q

negotiations with DHL and resolved any dispute regarding CAMS Amounts prior to
entering into a settlement; the probability of later litigation regarding liability under the
indemnification provision would be slim.
B.

THE CLAIMS FOR RELIEF AS SET FORTH IN THE COMPLAINT ARE NOT
ARBITRABLE BECAUSE THEY D O NOT INVOLVE A DISPUTE OVER THE
CAMS DATA AMOUNTS.

In apparent recognition of the limited scope of the arbitration provision, the USS
Parties next claim that the scope and liability issues set forth in the Complaint qualify as
disputes concerning the CAMS Data amounts. They claim that the Complaint ultimately
comes down to whether the Mariposa Franchisees owe anything at all. Thus, the claims
should be arbitrated under the provision concerning disputes of CAM Data amounts.
(Appellees' Brief at 31-32). The USS Parties' characterization is an oversimplification of
the matter. As stated above, the Complaint raises claims dealing with liability and the
scope of the indemnification provision. It does not dispute the amount of the payment as
reflected in the CAMS Data under the indemnification provision.
While liability issues and damages issues often go together, they are not one in the
same. Liability issues can and may be resolved separately from damages/amounts issues.
Indeed, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act allows for proceedings in a civil case to be
4

USS's claim that only an arbitrator can decide if contingent circumstances for
arbitration have been met is not applicable here. As admitted by USS, the "facts are not
in dispute" in this case. (Appellee Brief at 17). It is undisputed that there is no dispute
concerning liability or the amount payable for freight under Paragraph l.a. It is
undisputed that no judgment was entered against USS in the DHL Lawsuit, and that USS
and DHL settled the case. Id at 13. And USS has admitted that "falfter entering into the
DHL Agreement, the USS Parties informed the Mariposa Franchisees of that agreement
by letter." Id (emphasis added). "In that letter, the USS parties ... provided the
Mariposa Franchisees with the CAMS Data for each of their respective franchises." IcL at
13-14. Therefore it is undisputed that USS did not provide the Mariposa Franchisees
with the CAMS Data until well after it has settled with DHL. As a result, there are no
factual disputes for the arbitrator to decide regarding the occurrence of contingent
circumstances requiring arbitration.

10

severed to accommodate arbitration for portions of the case. Utah Code § 78B-11108(7). Moreover, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permit claims in a civil case to be
severed and bifurcated. See e,g. Utah R. Civ. P. 42(b). In this case, the final amount
owed to the USS Parties may well turn on "the accuracy of the CAMS Data" (Brief of
Appellees at 31), but the initial questions concerning liability and the scope of the
indemnification provision may or may not lead to the issue of whether the CAMS Data
amounts are accurate. Once the initial issues are resolved, the court then may refer any
dispute concerning the amounts to arbitration.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER SHOULD B E REVERSED BECAUSE NONE OF
THE CLAIMS IN THE COMPLAINT ARE SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION.

The district court erred when it broadly construed the arbitration provision in the
settlement agreement to apply to the claims in the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint. Its
interpretation of the limited arbitration provision invites the absurd result of an
accountant being required to address issues of liability and contract interpretation.
Moreover, the district court's misapplication of the arbitration provision does not further
the policy in favor of arbitration. Utah courts favor arbitration but they do so only when
the parties have agreed to arbitrate the dispute. If no enforceable agreement to arbitrate
exists, the court "may not" compel arbitration. Utah Code § 78B-11-108(3).

As

explained above, the Complaint was limited to liability issues under the indemnification
provision.

These issues were outside the scope of the arbitration provision in the

settlement agreement and no other enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists to support the
district court's order. The Mariposa Franchisees therefore respectfully ask this Court to
reverse the district court's order compelling arbitration and dismissing the Complaint.

11

II.

T H E DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE
DISMISSAL W A S N O T APPROPRIATE UNDER THE UTAH ARBITRATION A C T .

The USS Parties claim that the Mariposa Franchisees have not challenged the
district court's order on appeal dismissing the Mariposa Franchisees' Complaint. (Brief
of Appellees at 1 n.2, 3-4 n.3). However, not only have the Mariposa Franchisees raised
that issue on appeal, but the issue itself is inextricably intertwined with the Mariposa
Franchisees' other arguments on appeal. Specifically, the Mariposa Franchisees have
argued that the claims for relief set forth in the Complaint are not subject to the
arbitration provision of the parties' Agreement. Thus, the Mariposa Franchisees brought
this appeal because "the district court erred in dismissing the Complaint and compelling
arbitration." (Brief of Appellant, 8, 10, 11-12, 15).
Indeed, the district court's order of dismissal was improper under the Utah
Uniform Arbitration Act.

Although the court did not refer to Utah Rule of Civil

Procedure 12 for the dismissal, that rule is the primary mechanism in this jurisdiction for
dismissing claims in civil actions. Specifically, Rule 12 states that after a party files a
complaint, the responding party shall file an answer or a motion to dismiss. Utah R. Civ.
P. 12(a), (b). The USS Parties filed a motion to compel arbitration and to dismiss the
case, relying on Miller Family Real Estate v. Hajizadeh, 2008 UT App 475, 200 P.3d
213. (R. 167). But in Miller, this Court did not consider whether a district court may
dismiss a complaint to compel arbitration under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act.
Instead, it considered whether the district court was justified in dismissing a complaint
without prejudice where the agreement between the parties required them first to mediate
their disputes. 2008 UT App 475,ffl[5,15-16.5
5

USS cited to several federal cases in the district court to support its claim that the
Complaint should be dismissed. (R. 167-68). However, the Federal Arbitration Act is
different from the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act. According to the federal act, in any

12

Under the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, a district court is not at liberty to
"dismiss" a properly served complaint even if all claims in the complaint are subject to
arbitration.

Utah Code §§ 78B-11-101, et seq. (the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act).

Specifically, the plain language of section 78B-11-108 states that "[i]f a party makes a
motion to the court to order arbitration, the court on just terms shall stay any judicial
proceeding that involves a claim alleged to be subject to the arbitration" until final
judgment is entered. Utah Code § 78B-11-108(6) (emphasis added). In addition, claims
in a complaint that are not subject to arbitration may be severed from the arbitrable
claims, and the court may limit the order staying the proceedings to the latter claims. Id.
at §78B-11-108(7).
If the legislature had intended dismissal to be a proper remedy in cases where all
the claims in the complaint were arbitrable, it would not have included a separate and
distinct severability provision or a provisions requiring that the district court stay the
proceedings. Id; Turner v. Staker & Parson Co., 2012 UT 30, f 12, - P.3d - (court
presumes the legislature used each word in a statute advisedly; it gives effect to every
word and it avoids interpretations that render words superfluous). As a result, the plain
language of the Act requires the district court to stay judicial proceedings if the claims
are arbitrable (Utah Code § 78B-11-108(6)); to sever non-arbitrable claims from
arbitrable claims when issuing the stay, (Id. at § 78B-11-108(7); and to proceed with nonarbitrable claims in the case., Id In addition, the Act contemplates the involvement of
the district court throughout the arbitration proceedings. See e^g., Utah Code § 78B-11109,-112.
Therefore, given the plain and direct language of the Utah Uniform Arbitration
Act, the district court's order of dismissal was in error.

"suit or proceeding" for a claim that is subject to arbitration, the district court shall stay
the trial of the action. 9 U.S.C.A. § 3. Federal law also allows a party to petition for
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that the district court's
September 06, 2011, Order granting USS's Motion to Dismiss and Compel Arbitration be
reversed and the case be remanded.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of July, 2012.
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arbitration. Id. at § 4. Utah statutory law does not contain a similar provision.
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